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ABSTRACT
This article asserts that debates concerning Poland’s energy security 
should be analysed in the context of transition politics and domes-
tic politics. Most importantly, domestic politics reveal the corrupted 
environment of the 1990s and early 2000s, which allowed Polish 
and Russian political, commercial and private actors to engage in 
rent seeking activities. The collusion between the two sets of actors 
had a detrimental effect on the way in which the debate concerning 
Polish energy security has developed. Furthermore, corruption 
scandals that brought to the open murky dealings between the 
Russian oil and gas sectors and Polish political actors, have not only 
kept generating interest around the question of the country’s 
energy security but also further fuelled concerns about Russia’s 
real intentions.
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In the first two decades since the collapse of the communist regime, the debate regarding 
Polish energy security was divided between those who maintained that the Russian threat 
is eminent, and those who took a more measured, technocratic view. The latter camp has 
pointed out that in real terms the country’s vulnerability has been largely limited to oil, 
since Poland’s electricity system is powered by domestically produced coal, and that 
dependency on Russian gas has been grossly overstated (Sharples 2012). Furthermore, 
Russian capacity to interfere in any significant way has been considerably constrained by 
the fact that the Polish state has managed to retain significant control over the country’s 
energy companies (Paszewski 2011). Lastly, and most importantly, the energy relationship 
with Russia has been complex and has been characterized at different periods either by 
co-operation or conflict. The simple characterization of Russia as a menacing actor under-
plays the importance of long periods of co-operation between the two countries (Górska 
2009; Zeniewski 2011). Despite a compelling case put forward by the technocratic camp, 
those who viewed Russia with a significant dose of scepticism had an upper hand in the 
public debates concerning Polish energy security. It was pointed out that the prevalence 
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of geopolitical considerations in debates about Polish energy has traditionally trumped 
technocratic considerations (Roth 2011; Longhurst and Zaborowski 2007; Leonard and 
Popescu 2007; Schmidt-Felzmann 2008).
This article aims to move beyond those two models and asserts that debates concern-
ing Poland’s energy security should be analysed in the context of transition politics. Both 
the technocratic and geopolitical explanations miss an important dimension that the 
study of political struggles and scandals brings to the forefront. Most importantly, 
domestic politics reveal the corrupted environment of the 1990s and early 2000s, which 
allowed Polish and Russian political, commercial and private actors to engage in rent 
seeking activities. The collusion between the two sets of actors had a detrimental effect 
on the way in which the debate concerning Polish energy security has developed and 
more broadly on the political and economic relationship between Russia and Poland.
Discussions in Poland about the country’s energy security can be narrowed down to 
two mutually exclusive narratives: a) Poland is insecure and vulnerable and b) Poland is 
relatively secure. The first view holds that Poland is insecure because the country depends 
on imports from Russia for 94% of its crude oil demand and for over 60% of gas demand. 
The second view, which argues that Poland is relatively secure, stresses that the electricity 
sector is heavily reliant on Polish produced coal with nearly all of its generated electricity 
(around 92–94%) coming from coal-fired power plants (IEA 2011). In this sense, gas, which 
Poland mainly imports from Russia, is not a critical part of the energy mix (Omelan and 
Opioła 2012; Bendyk et al. 2015). Furthermore, in the mid-2010s Poland completed the 
construction of a LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminal, which will considerably ease its 
reliance on Russian gas (Kublik 2014). At the same time, shale gas, a potential game 
changer in the Polish-Russian gas relationship, was unlikely to be extracted in any 
commercial quantities before the end of the decade according to the most optimistic 
scenario (Górski and Raszewski 2014; Kublik 2015).
The situation is very different in the case of oil. Poland imports crude oil primarily from 
Russia through the Druzhba pipeline. This dependency on one pipeline makes the country 
vulnerable to potential disruptions. Yet, those less alarmist about Poland’s energy security 
point out that the Naftoport Oil Terminal which Poland built in the mid-2010s with a 
capacity of 35 million tonnes of crude oil per year could be increased to 50 million tonnes 
in the event of major problems with the Druzhba Pipeline. Finally, Poland has two large 
refineries, with a total crude distillation capacity of 493,000 barrels per day that have been 
modernized over the last two decades (IEA 2014; see also: Gawlikowska-Fyk and Nowak 
2015).
The privatization of the Polish state-owned energy firms over the last 25 years has 
proceeded relatively slowly (Grudziński 2011). The trade unions and powerful interest 
groups initially resisted quick privatization especially in the mining sector; for instance, 
major Polish oil companies only went public in 1999 and 2005. Today, the Polish state still 
owns 72 % of the Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG), which is practically the only 
importer of gas and effectively controls the wholesale market. In addition, the state 
controls 53% of the Lotos Group (refinery and gas stations) and Orlen (refinery and gas 
stations) through a golden share mechanism (Grudziński 2016). The coal industry, com-
prising of 27 mines, is dominated by three state-owned enterprises (Kasztelewicz 2012).
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The degree to which the Polish state managed to retain control over the country’s 
energy companies meant that since the end of the 1990s influence over the energy sector 
has steadily shifted from communist era managers to governing political parties and 
patrimonial networks that developed around them (Gadowska 2005). Tellingly, in the 
period from 1990 to 2010 the Polish oil company Orlen went through seven presidents. 
Those changes often reflected the shifts in the balance of power either between left and 
right parties or various fractions on the left or on the right. Another symptom of the 
politicization of the energy sector was the presence throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
of powerful middle-men in the oil and gas sectors, who were affiliated either with the left 
or right but did not have any previous experience in the energy sector (Matys 2003).
The politicization of the Polish energy sector throughout the 1990s led to the rise of 
corruption, which produced a conducive environment for murky dealings between Polish 
and Russian political and commercial actors involved in the oil and gas sector (Staniszkis 
2001; Krasnodębski 2003). In turn, this collusion had a very negative impact on the Polish- 
Russian energy relationship. For instance, the persistence of middle companies in the oil 
and gas trade has been seen as proof that the Russian lobby was at work in Poland and 
actively collaborating with the post-communist elites. It was assumed that the ultimate 
aim of this co-operation has been to hamper Polish efforts aimed at diversifying away 
from Russian oil and gas supplies. The discussion in the following sections will show that 
the Russian-Polish energy relationship has been greatly damaged by the corruption 
scandals that erupted in the 2000s, but that this relationship has substantially improved 
from the early 2010s onwards as the actors and practices that dominated the 1990s lost 
influence.
Gas: the case of bartimpex
The early 1990s constituted a high point in the Russian-Polish energy relationship with the 
Polish political establishment openly welcoming Gazprom’s 1992 proposal for the con-
struction of a transit pipeline through Belarusian and Polish territory to deliver gas from 
the giant gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula to European markets. The new pipeline was 
principally designed to serve the North and Eastern German market and, to a lesser 
degree, Poland. Another reason for building a pipeline that would cross Belarus and 
Poland was the circumvention of Ukraine through which nearly all Russian gas exports to 
Western Europe had passed (Högselius 2012). The Russians argued that Ukraine was 
becoming an unreliable transit state due to high levels of theft and the risk of interruption 
to supplies (Víctor and Makarova Víctor 2004: 1).
From the Russian perspective Poland promised to be an attractive new market as it had 
not been part of the centrally mandated gasification in the 1960s and 1980s and was a 
country where coal retained a vastly dominant share of energy supply. In 1975 Poland 
bought 2.3 bcm (billion cubic metres) from the USSR, in 1980 4.9 bcm, and in 1990 7.8 
bcm. The Russian thinking was in line with plans drawn up by Polish policy makers, who as 
early as 1990 called for the signing of new long-term contracts with the then USSR. Poland 
also began negotiations with other gas exporting countries (most importantly Norway) 
(Sejmu 1990). The new long-term contract with Gazprom on gas would replace deficient 
agreements concluded in the 1980s, aid the expansion of the domestic pipeline network 
and provide additional budget revenues. It was also argued, that the pipeline would help 
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to tie Poland to Germany’s gas market and initiate a transition towards cleaner electric 
power generation (Górska 2009: 6). The proposed Russian pipeline gained momentum 
when negotiations with the Norwegians came to a halt.
The deal on the new pipeline was signed in mid-1993. Initially, it was agreed that the 
capacity of the completed pipeline would be 67 bcm and that Poland would buy 14 bcm 
annually (Matys and Smoleński 2001). It should be kept in mind that in 1993 Poland 
consumed only 10 bcm. Thus, rather unsurprisingly, a number of critics argued that 
officials responsible for negotiating the deal contracted for excessive gas volumes and 
thereby limited the scope for diversification away from the Russian gas supplies in the 
future. Another major issue from the critics’ perspective was the “take-or-pay” clause in 
the contract, which obliged Poland to purchase quantity specified in the order even if 
delivery would not be taken (Górska 2009: 9). That said, criticism was largely confined to 
leftwing academic and political circles as the deal with the Russians was signed by the 
post-Solidarity government led by Hana Suchocka while Lech Wałęsa was the sitting 
President (Krasowski 2012). It was also supported by the incoming post-Communist 
administration that took over power in late 1993. Yet, the controversies surrounding 
Polish negotiating tactics and the nature of the deal never entirely went away and 
10 years later were heavily criticized in the report issued by the Supreme Audit Office 
concerning the ways in which Poland obtained its gas supplies (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli 
2004). It should be also mentioned that the total gas consumption rose to just 11.4 bcm 
by 2001 which was some way off the forecast made by the Polish Academy of Science 
made in 1993, on which the deal was based, which predicted that gas consumption would 
grow by 2010 to around 20 bcm and according to the most optimistic scenarios could 
even increase to 27–35 bcm (Víctor and Makarova Víctor 2004: 27).
The key player on the Polish side was the fully state-owned Polish Oil and Gas 
Company (Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo, best known by its Polish acronym 
– PGNiG) which in the early 1990s employed over 42,000 people. This company handled 
the exploration, production, sale and distribution of gas and was responsible for the 
construction and repairs of the gas network. It should be also mentioned that at the start 
of the 1990s the company was in a poor financial state with a 50% drop in gas consump-
tion and a fourfold increase in the price after PGNiG started paying Gazprom in hard 
currency for its natural gas in 1991. Hence, the prospect of being involved in a major new 
project – the construction of the Polish section of the new pipeline was estimated at 3 
billion dollars – was a very attractive proposition (Błaszczyk and Cylwik 1999: 42).
In a configuration in which PGNiG and Gazprom were keen to co-operate it was rather 
puzzling that EuroPolGaz, owned 48% by PGNiG and 48% by Gazprom, which was set up 
to construct and operate the Polish section of the pipeline, was joined by the third party 
Polish marketing company Gas Trading which owned 4% of the shares. According to the 
official explanation this was due to the Polish Commercial Code, which stipulated that at 
least three shareholders were required in order to establish a joint stock company (Matys 
and Smoleński 2001). Most controversially 25% of the Gaz Trading shares were allocated 
to Bartimpex, a private company owned by Aleksander Gudzowaty, which had acted as an 
intermediary in barter exchanges with Gazprom since 1992. A few years later, Bartimpex 
shares increased to 36% (Olczyk, Baranowska, and Furman 2013; see also Bosacki 2002).
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According to Jan Olszewski, Polish Prime Minister between 1991 and 1992, Gudzowaty 
was considered by the Russians as a skilful go-between and as able to facilitate coopera-
tion between Russian and Polish gas companies. Olszewski stated that Gudzowaty, who in 
the 1970s worked in Moscow on behalf of the Polish textile industry and was responsible 
for coordinating the sale of Polish produced railway equipment to Russia in the 1980s, was 
in a position to reach an agreement with the Russians on economic matters that he could 
not – this despite his being in direct contact with his Russian counterpart Yegor Gaidar in 
his role as Prime Minister (Kublik 2013). In the years to come Gudzowaty often boasted in 
public about his friendship with Gazprom’s boss Rem Vyakhirev and about his newly 
accumulated fortune which by the end of the 1990s reached over 1 billion dollars. 
Gudzowaty himself argued that Russians liked to do business with him because he was 
trustworthy and never tried to cheat them (Matys and Smoleński 2001). Indeed, some 
argue that ‘without Gudzowaty nothing important could have happened on the Polish 
gas market’ in the 1990s (Olczyk, Baranowska, and Furman 2013). It was reported that 
throughout this time members of the PGNiG board had tried to eliminate Gudzowaty and 
other intermediaries but their attempts were frustrated by Gazprom whose representa-
tives bluntly rejected the idea (Zeniewski 2011: 26). However, the special relationship with 
Gazprom tells only part of the story, for another source of Gudzowaty’s political and 
economic dominance in the Polish-Russian gas trade was based on a network of political 
contacts that he had built and maintained among Polish political elites both from the 
right and the left (Górska 2009: 11).
Throughout the 1990s Bartimpex employed 17 ex-ministers who served in the post- 
Solidarity and post-Communist governments. The ministers Gudzowaty employed were 
at different stages responsible for industry, privatization, the economy, transport and 
telecommunication. Some, but not all of them, had begun their careers during the 
Communist times like Gudzowaty himself (Matys and Smoleński 2001; Solska 2013). 
Furthermore, the head of Bartimpex contributed some $1 million to Lech Wałęsa’s 
Presidential campaign in 1995 (Górska 2009: 11). After Wałęsa lost his Presidential bid 
for re-election, Gudzowaty switched his alliance from the right to the left and in the next 
election cycle firmly threw his weight behind the post-Communist incumbent Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski and his political allies.
The construction of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline lasted from 1994 to 2006. In the late 
2000s, pipeline capacity reached 32.9 bcm, almost half of what was initially intended 
(Gazprom 2016). The Yamal pipeline undoubtedly increased Polish reliance on Russian 
gas; however, given the dominance of coal in generating electricity, the pipeline did not 
dramatically alter the country’s energy security. As mentioned above, Poland sits on 
Europe’s largest coal reserves and produces about 90% of its electricity from hard coal 
and lignite while in the early 2010s Poland’s total natural gas imports amounted to just 12 
bcm (IEA 2014). More controversial has been the issue of price, since Poland has paid 
considerably more for Russian gas than its wealthier counterparts in western Europe 
(Piński and Trębski 2003). As late as the mid-2010s, Poland, along with the Czech 
Republic, was paying $500 per thousand cubic metres of gas, while across the border 
Germany along with Austria and France paid less than $400. Thus, the lack of diversifica-
tion in gas supplies did not hamper Polish energy security per se but proved to be very 
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costly, as James Henderson explained: ‘[Gazprom] essentially acts as discrimination 
monopolist. If it has a significant market share in a country, or if it can see that a country 
has limited alternatives, then it prices accordingly (quoted in Kates and Luo 2014).
To sum up, the Yamal-Europe pipeline would have been built without Aleksander 
Gudzowaty. Both the Russian and Polish states and their companies Gazprom and PGNiG 
had vested interests in the construction of the new pipeline in the early 1990s. Gazprom 
inserted Bartimpex into the equation due to its dominant position and presumably 
because Rem Vyakhirev and his inner circle directly benefited from it (Kramer 2013). On 
the Polish side Gudzowaty “protected” his company by building and maintaining a vast 
network of political backers.
On the outside Bartimpex looked like a classic rent seeking mechanism – in itself not 
exceptional in the post-Communist space. Furthermore, in Poland corrupt practices were 
not unique to the gas sector and were common also in other branches of the Polish 
energy sector. Kaja Gadowska in her study of the Polish coal sector in the 1990s stated: 
‘the fundamental mechanism serving the survival of the system is the presence of highly 
developed clientelistic networks and mutual dependencies between individual policy 
makers, i.e. key actors of the mining sector as well as its economic and political environ-
ment. The postponement of reforms serves to maintain opaqueness and facilitate the flow 
of public funds into private pockets’ (2005: 23; see also Woś 2014). Although patron-client 
relations and widespread corruption were not uncommon, Bartimpex was nevertheless a 
special case.
Its very existence, the way in which Gudzowaty operated and maintained contacts with 
the political elites and his huge fortune inevitably fuelled suspicion that the Polish energy 
sector was penetrated by the Russia lobby intent on hampering Polish energy security. 
Konstanty Miodowicz, a counter-intelligence chief through the first half of the 1990s, went 
as far as to suggest that Gudzowaty was directly connected to the Russian mafia 
(Wiadomosci 2002). In short, the damage to the Polish-Russian energy relationship was 
done.
Oil: orlengate and J&S
At the beginning of the 1990s the Polish oil sector underwent a profound economic crisis: 
the economic recession, the outdated structure of the Polish oil industry and the lack of 
modernization and investment throughout the 1990s were amongst the most significant 
problems. The initial plans envisioned a vertical integration of the sector through the 
construction of the Polish Oil Company (Polska Kompania Naftowa – PKN) and a steady 
pace of privatization. At the same time, the state would stay in control of the industry 
through retaining a majority stake in the strategic parts of the oil infrastructure. However, 
due to trade union protests and the negative attitude of the refinery’s management 
towards privatization as well as a lack of interest on behalf of Western investors, the plans 
came to a halt. In the following years Polish governments drafted new strategies for the oil 
sector, but key elements stayed the same. Most importantly it was argued that the state 
should stay in control of the oil sector and that partial privatization, in particular of the 
refineries that were in need of huge investments, should go ahead. Towards the end of 
the 1990s, in the middle of the economic crises, the government decided that the Gdańsk 
refinery should be privatized as soon as possible. Yet, as before western investors showed 
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little interest and only the Russian company Lukoil entered negotiations in the early 
2000s. However, politicians from both sides of the political spectrum bluntly rejected the 
Russian proposition (Paszewski 2011).
The issue of the privatization of Gdańsk’s oil refinery, the country’s second-largest, and 
the Russian offer re-emerged in the mid-2000s when it emerged that Jan Kulczyk, Poland’s 
richest man, had offered to act as a middleman in the sale of the Gdansk refinery to Lukoil. 
This proposition was not an unusual one for Kulczyk to make since he was best known for 
buying shares in companies held previously by the Polish state and selling them to private 
investors for lucrative profits (for a detailed analysis see Jaworski 2004). The scandal 
around the sale of the refinery significantly escalated when it came to light that during 
his dealings with the Russians Kulczyk met on several occasions in Vienna with a retired 
KGB spy Vladimir Alganov, who had been based in Warsaw between 1981 and 1992, in 
order to discuss the deal (Wagstyl 2004). What made matters even worse was that 
Alganov was a well-known person in Poland who had been involved in another high- 
profile political scandal in the mid 1990’s which led to the resignation of the then left- 
wing prime minister Józef Oleksy (Perlez 1996). It also quickly emerged that President 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski directly supported the sale of the refinery and backed Kulczyk in 
his efforts whereas Leszek Miller’s post-Communist government was split on the idea, 
with some key ministers directly opposing it (Krasowski 2014). All these revelations 
resulted in a political earthquake on the Polish political scene and led to the creation of 
a parliamentary committee popularly known as “Orlengate” (2004–2005). Its proceedings 
were televised live on the main TV channels and were covered widely in the press 
(Czuchnowski and Wielowieyska 2004). “Orlengate” took place in the shadows of another 
major scandal know as “Rywingate”, which shook Polish society to its core and which 
involved a top Polish media mogul/major Polish intellectual (Adam Michnik) and a 
majority of the Polish left-wing political elite (Skórzynski 2003; Zarycki 2009; Król 2015).
During the proceedings of the “Orlengate” committee, which began looking into 
various aspects of the Polish energy sector, it emerged that not only had Russian gas 
but also oil been purchased via powerful intermediary companies since the late 1990s. 
(Czuchnowski 2005). The greatest controversy surrounded the J&S Company based in 
Cyprus, which was virtually unknown to anyone in Poland but which was responsible for 
the sale of the majority of Russian oil to two Polish refineries. Perplexed Poles also learnt 
that two naturalized Ukrainian musicians headed the company. Rather understandably, 
during the Orlengate scandal, J&S’s role in the Polish oil market was often compared to 
Gudzowaty’s company and to his dealings with the Russians (Czarkowski 2008). However, 
there were some important differences. Most importantly, J&S sold oil to Poland at highly 
competitive prices (Todorowa 2016). This fact in itself would explain why J&S for a period 
of about 7 years was not on the radar of either Polish policy makers or commentators, as 
opposed to Gazprom and the intermediaries that they supported (Morka 1998). 
Furthermore, despite a fairly wide consensus in Poland that Gudzowaty was Vyakhirev’s 
stooge, the same type of consensus however, does not exist in the case of J&S with some 
arguing that the company was a creation of the Russian oil lobby and others stating that it 
was a Polish idea (Wielowieyska 2015).
The picture that emerged from the Orlengate affair was one of a country run by corrupt 
politicians who readily collude with a home grown as well as a foreign oligarchy. 
According to some commentators, Poland, a country that had just joined the EU, seemed 
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 7
to resemble Ukraine rather than a Western democracy (Indulski, Jakimczyk, and 
Dzierżanowski 2005). The Orlengate scandal was a watershed moment in the Polish 
post-Communist history. It marked the end of the post-Communists as a serious political 
force and destroyed the political careers of those involved, including the Prime Minister 
and the President. One could even go as far as to say that the Polish transition can be 
divided into two periods – one before and after the oil scandal (Millard 2006). Most 
importantly, Orlengate opened the doors to Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform 
(PO) two political parties, that have their roots in the post-Solidarity camp, and which have 
dominated and shaped the Polish political scene from the mid-2000s onwards (Krasowski 
2014: 257, 2016). Orlengate has also cast a long shadow over the Polish energy security 
debate. In response to the country’s energy dilemma, the new partners began drawing up 
ambitious plans regarding new pipelines that would bring oil and gas from Central Asia 
and other locations and finally end Polish dependency on Russia and Russian interest 
groups (Tymanowski 2012: 83; Tomaszewski 2011; Roth 2011; Czarkowski 2006). The issue 
of climate change and alternative sources of energy apart from fossil fuels did not play any 
part in the discussions (Bednorz 2009; see also: Gardiner 2015; Wantuch 2016).
The political fallout from Orlengate meant that the energy security issue stayed high on 
the country’s political agenda despite the fact that there was little room for concern 
(Tymanowski 2012). After all the Russians never tried to shut down the Druzhba pipeline 
which has been the real Achilles heel of the Polish energy system. However, by the mid- 
2000s very few politicians from the new establishment attempted to make a distinction 
between corruption, the role of the middle companies and energy security (Roth 2011). 
The sensational reporting around this issue throughout the 2000s fuelled the frenzy 
(Ostrowski 2010: 250; Bieleń 2012: 29). According to Zbigniew Łucki (2011) this was 
possible because the Polish public had a fairly poor understanding about energy matters 
and were not able to distinguish between political rhetoric and reality (see also: Łucki et al. 
2006).
Polish accession to the EU in 2004 led to yet another rift in the Polish-Russian energy 
relations. In the second part of the 2000s Polish politicians had put forward several 
initiatives in the European forum in a bid to decrease dependence on energy supplies 
from Russia. This has included a treaty aimed at providing collective assistance in energy- 
related matters along the lines of the NATO charter, and Poland’s support for securing 
direct gas supplies from Central Asian states that bypassed the Russian territory, such as 
the European Union-sponsored Nabucco pipeline (Goldthau and Sitter 2014: 16; see also 
Baev and Overland 2010). The reference to “NATO”, which played well in Poland with the 
right and centre-right electorate, was in particular provocative and unnecessary. The idea 
was floated by Polish Prime Minster Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz who in an Financial Times 
guest commentary suggested that: “the energy security treaty could follow formulas 
contained in the 1949 Washington Treaty, an agreement that allowed for effective 
transatlantic co-operation, or provisions of the modified Treaty of Brussels that estab-
lished the Western European Union in 1948.” (Marcinkiewicz 2006). The relationships 
between Russia and Poland hit rock bottom when in 2006 Radosław Sikorski, then 
defence minister, famously noted that the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline 
under the Baltic Sea, which bypassed Poland, echoed the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, a pact that led to the outbreak of the Second World War (Kloth 2006). A very 
different Sikorski appeared in Berlin in 2011, at the height of the Euro crisis, to make 
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this statement: “I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so but 
here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity” (Taras 
2014: 736).
The second part of the 2000s was high on damaging rhetoric but rather low on actions. 
The rhetoric became more high pitched in 2006 when the Polish Oil Company Orlen 
bought the Lithuanian refinery Mazeikiai, after Russians had openly stated that they 
wanted to buy it. The pipeline, which delivers Russian oil to the refinery “broke” shortly 
after the sale was completed and forced the Poles to supply oil in other, much more 
expensive ways. The refinery, which Poland purchased at a huge cost, is often hailed at the 
worst business deal in Polish history (Gwiazdowski 2010). In 2014 alone, Mazeikiai accu-
mulated losses of over 1 billion zloty (Grzeszak 2014). The Mazeikiai deal sealed the 
breakdown in Polish-Russian energy relations.
The aftermath
The rapprochement with the Russians was facilitated mainly by the failure of Polish policy. 
The Nord Stream pipeline was built and became operational whereas the Polish backed 
Nabucco pipeline was scrapped (Goldthau and Sitter 2014: 16; see also Miller 2010). The 
first signs of how badly misguided Polish attempts at building alternative pipelines from 
Central Asia had been became visible at the 2007 energy summit in Poland. The key player 
in the whole equation, the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev snubbed the Polish 
invitation and instead attended a meeting with his Russian and Turkmen counterparts 
(Kublik 2014) The EU, on its part, rejected Polish suggestions for constructing an “Energy 
NATO” and stressed the interdependence and need for cooperation with Russia 
(Tomaszewski 2011). Furthermore, the European Commission in its documents reminded 
Poland that the country was more secure than others in the region (Nagy, Rychlicki, and 
Siemek 2009). The Poles on their part became disillusioned with the lack of progress in 
Ukraine after the Orange Revolution and reflected critically on their previous support 
which had at times been almost unconditional. Yet, overall Poland’s involvement with 
Ukraine remained high during the rapprochement phase (Szeptycki 2009). Furthermore, 
Russian companies also halted their efforts aimed at trying to buy parts of the Polish 
energy infrastructure through shady intermediaries. Another important step was the 
decision by the Polish centre-right elites to bring to a virtual halt the privatization of 
the oil and gas sector and to eliminate potential insecurities that came with it (Dąborowski 
2014: 11). At the same time, some started to speculate whether Poland would not be 
better off if it simply sold Mazeikiai to the Russians, since no one else had declared an 
interest anyhow (Gadomski 2010).
The Putin administration also made some reassuring moves towards Poland as it 
eliminated intermediary companies – a product largely of the 1990s – that dominated 
the gas and oil trade between the two countries. Aleksander Gudzowaty’s spectacular 
business career came crushing down after the departure of his patron on the Russian side 
Rem Vyakhirev from Gazprom. Gazprom’s new bosses simply refused to work with 
Gudzowaty. Furthermore, at the Davos Summit in 2009 Putin assured Polish Prime 
Minster Donald Tusk that Moscow wanted to sell oil to Poland directly without the 
participation of any middle-companies. The Polish oil company Orlen signed its first 
contract directly with Rosneft in early 2013 (Kublik 2013). This was a significant move as 
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it clarified the relationship between the two countries and removed an issue which had 
been a cause of major controversies in Poland and responsible for a whole host of 
misguided policies. An additional important element, that contributed to the change 
was a more relaxed Polish attitude towards foreigners, including Russians, in part because 
‘an increased sense of collective security, in part because of newfound economic con-
fidence’ (Taras 2014: 710; see also: Nocuń and Brzeziecki 2010).
To sum up, in recent years the Polish-Russian energy relationship has been relatively 
placid. Russia has not attempted to take any radical steps that would fundamentally 
undermine Polish energy security. Furthermore, various fixers and middle companies, 
which in the 1990s and 2000s acted as intermediaries in the sale of oil and gas between 
major Polish and Russian energy companies, have been virtually eliminated, making the 
energy relationship between the two countries much more transparent and straightfor-
ward. Russia has also ended its attempts at trying to buy Polish refineries whereas Poland 
brought to a halt its attempts at diversifying energy supplies from Central Asia and 
terminated its policies of accruing energy assets in the post-Soviet space. Further, its 
has stopped using – at least in energy relations – confrontational language.
Conclusion
Polish energy security was never threatened directly by the Russians. Yet, the issue of 
energy has remained high on the Polish political agenda for the last 25 years. In some 
ways the Polish position was fully justifiable. In the early 1990s the country had just 
became independent while energy resources, infrastructure and technical know-how 
were one of Russia’s key assets which, in theory, could be used against Poland. The 
emergence of middle companies was interpreted and viewed as a possible move by the 
Russians against the Poles. The fact that post-communist politicians had close relation-
ships with those companies inevitably fuelled suspicions. Yet, the middle-companies were 
not the Kremlin’s secret weapon but merely a rent-seeking mechanism set up by political 
and business actors for the purposes of their own enrichment. Unfortunately, the scandals 
that accompanied those companies, their creation and survival, did real damage to the 
Polish-Russian energy business relations which, however, recovered and are likely to be 
conducted very differently in the future.
To some extent, the legacy of a relatively stable Polish-Russian energy relationship was 
visible during the Ukrainian crises of 2014–15. Whereas Poland advocated strong sanc-
tions against Russia and an increased NATO presence on the eastern flank of the alliance, 
the issue of energy security has been much lower on the Polish agenda than one would 
expect given the history of regional energy relations in the 2000s (MacAskill 2017). Rather, 
the debate in Poland focused on the Ukrainian internal energy situation, unpaid bills and 
on gas storage capacity, with many commentators also discussing the deeply corrupted 
nature of the Ukrainian gas trade (Konończuk 2015). Yet, it has to be noted that Poles 
asked the EU member states to coordinate their energy policy more closely and that they 
worked towards the reduction of their dependency on Russian gas largely through the 
construction of a gas storage capacity and gas links with countries that are now most 
dependent on gas sold by Gazprom (Economist , 2014).
10 W. OSTROWSKI
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Wojciech Ostrowski is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Social Sciences 
and a Director of the MA programme Energy and Environmental Change.
References
Dziennik.pl. 2009. Gudzowaty Dawał Pieniądze SLD. Wiadomosci Dziennik.pl. Dziennik Gazeta 
Prawna. 24.03.
Baev, P., and I. Overland. 2010. “The South Stream versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitics and 
Economic (Ir)rationales and Political Stakes in Mega-projects.” International Affairs 86 (5, 
September): 1075–1090. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00929.x.
Bednorz, J. 2009. “Węgiel Gwarancją Bezpieczeństwa Politycznego Polski.” Polityka Energetyczna 12: 
13–28.
Bendyk, E., M. Popkiewicz, M. Sutowski, and U. Papajak. 2015. Polski Węgiel. Krytyka Polityczna: 
Warszawa.
Bieleń, S. 2012. The Possibility of Reconciliation in Polish-Russian Relations, 11–34. Foreign Policy 
Research Center: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, (27).
Błaszczyk, B., and A. Cylwik, eds. 1999. Charakterystyka Wybranych Sektorów Infrastrukturalnych I 
Wrażliwych W Gospodarce Polskiej Oraz Możliwości Ich Prywatyzacji. Warszawa: CASE- Centrum 
Analiz Spoleczno-Ekonomicznych.
Bosacki, M. 2002. ““Gazeta” Kontra Gudzowaty.” Gazeta Wyborcza 03.02.
Czarkowski, M. 2006. Naftowy Poker. Vol. 30. Warszawa: Tygodnik Przegląd.
Czarkowski, M. 2008. Ropa, Gaz, Mafia I © Służb. Warszawa: Tygodnik Przegląd. 02.17.
Czuchnowski, W., and D. Wielowieyska. 2004. Komisja Śledcza Zbada Aferę PKN Orlen. Warszawa: 
Gazeta Wyborcza. 29.05.
Czuchnowski, W. 2005. Jest Raport Komisji Ds. Orlenu. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza. 27.09.
Dąborowski, T., 2014. Breaking the boundaries. The transformation of Central European gas markets. 
OSW Point of View, Number 46, December.
Economist, 2014. Paying the price. 29.04.
Gadomski, W. 2010. Biznes I “Jagiellońska Polityka”. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza. 31.05.
Gadowska, K. 2005. “Clientelism in the Silesian Mining Industry.” In Political Corruption in Poland, 
edited by A. Surdej, and K. Gadowska. Warszawa: Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität 
Bremen. 21–46 .
Gardiner, B., 2015. When energy independence clashes with public health. New York Times, 08.07.
Gawlikowska-Fyk, A., and Z. Nowak, 2015, “Nuclear Energy in Poland”. PISM Reports, Warsaw.
Gazprom. 2016. Yamal – Europe. St. Petersburg, Russian Federation: Gazprom’s Webpage.
Goldthau, A., and N. Sitter. 2014. “A Liberal Actor in A Realist World? the Commission and the 
External Dimension of the Single Market for Energy.” Journal of European Public Policy 21 (10): 
1452–1472. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.912251.
Górska, J., 2009. “Dealing with Power Poland’s Energy Policy Towards Russia, 1989-2004.” Working 
Paper Series of the Research Network 1989, Working Paper 23/2009. pp. 2–30.
Górski, J., and S. Raszewski. 2014. “Energy Security or Energy Governance? Legal and Political 
Aspects of Sustainable Exploration of Shale Gas in Poland.” Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal 
(OGEL) 12 (3): 1–51 .
Grudziński, Z., 2016. Spółki sektora paliwowo-energetycznego na warszawskiej Giełdzie Papierów 
Wartościowych. Przegląd Górniczy, 72.
Grudziński, Z. 2011. “Prywatyzacja Sektora Paliwowo-energetycznego Na Rynkach Publicznych.” 
Polityka Energetyczna 14: 59–77.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 11
Grzeszak, A., 2014. Czy padnie najbardziej znana polska rafineria? Co można w Możejkach? Politykaa, 
29 lipc.
Gwiazdowski, R., 2010. Z determinacją, do końca. Forbes, 03.08.
Hogselius, Per. Red Gas: Russia and the origins of European energy dependence. Springer, 2012.
IEA. 2011. Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Poland. Paris: IEA Review. 9–148 .
IEA. 2014. Energy Supply Security 2014: Poland. Paris: OECD/IEA.
Indulski, G., J. Jakimczyk, and M. Dzierżanowski. 2005. “Koniec Ologarchii.” Wprost 18.12.
Jaworski, D. 2004. Kim Pan Jest, Panie Kulczyk - Sylwetka Najbogatszego Polaka. Warszawa: Gazeta 
Wyborcza. 15.07.
Kasztelewicz, Z. 2012. “Blaski I Cienie Górnictwa Węglowego W Polsce.” Polityka Energetyczna 15: 7– 
27.
Kates, G., and L. Luo. 2014. Russian Gas: How Much Is That. Prague: RFERL. 01.07.
Kloth, H. M. 2006. Indirect Hitler Comparison. Polish Minister Attacks Schröder and Merkel. Hamburg: 
Der Spiegel International Online. 01.05.
Konończuk, W. 2015. Reforma Numer Jeden. Dlaczego Ukraina Musi Zreformować Sektor Gazowy. 
Warszawa: Komentarze OSW. 09.02.
Kontroli, N. I. 2004. Informacja O Wynikach Kontroli Zaopatrzenia W Gaz Ziemny. Najwyższa Izba 
Kontroli, Warszawa, lipiec.
Kramer, A. E. 2013. Rem Vyakhirev, Former Chief of Gazprom, Dies at 78. New York Times (New York). 
February 17.
Krasnodębski, Z. 2003. Demokracja Peryferii. Warszawa: Slowo/obraz terytoria.
Krasowski, R. 2012. Po Południu. Upadek Elit Solidarnościowych Po Zdobyciu Władzy. Warszawa: 
Czerwone i Czarne.
Krasowski, R. 2014. Czas Gniewu. Rozkwit I Upadek Imperium SLD”. wyd. Czerwone i czarne, 
Warszawa.
Krasowski, R. 2016. “Czas Kaczynskiego: Polityka Jako Wieczny Konflikt. Warszawa: Czerwone i 
Czarne.
Król, M. 2015. Byliśmy Głupi. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Czerwone i Czarne.
Kublik, A. 2013. Jamalska Rura-ostatnia Część Imperium Gudzowatego. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza. 
14.02.
Kublik, A. 2014. Europa I Polska Mocno Uzaleznione Od Gazu I Ropy Z Rosji. Warszawa: Gazeta 
Wyborcza. 24.03.
Kublik, A. 2015. Koncesje Na Poszukiwanie Gazu Z Łupkow W Polsce. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza. 
09.02.
Leonard, M., and N. Popescu. 2007. A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations: European Council on 
Foreign Relations Vol. 9 London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
Longhurst, K. A., and M. Zaborowski. 2007. The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy 
Priorities. Blackwell Publishing.
Łucki, Z., A. Byrska-Rąpała, B. Soliński, and I. Stach. 2006. “Badanie Świadomości Energetycznej 
Społeczeństwa Polskiego.” Polityka Energetyczna 9 (2): 5–63.
Łucki, Z. 2011. Wyzwania Energetyczne Polski W Świetle Spójności Społeczno-ekonomicznej. Reszow: 
Nierówności Społeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy/Uniwersytet Rzeszowski. (nr 18). 372–383.
MacAskill, E. 2017. Russia Says US Troops Arriving in Poland Pose Threat to Its Security. London: 
Guardian, 01.12.
Marcinkiewicz, K., 2006. Europe’s energy musketeers must stand together. Financial Times, 02.09.
Matys, M., and P. Smoleński. 2001. “Stajnie Gudzowatego.” Gazeta Wyborcza (Duzy Format) Reprinted 
(01.01.2013).
Matys, M. 2003. Towarzystwo. Biznesmeni I Politycy. seria “Fakt”, wyd. Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa.
Millard, F. 2006. “Poland’s Politics and the Travails of Transition after 2001: The 2005 Elections.” 
Europe-Asia Studies 58 (7): 1007–1031. doi:10.1080/09668130600926215.
Miller, L. 2010. Porażka Na Własne Życzenie. Warszawa: Leszek Miller (Oficjalny Blog Polityczny). 
06.01.
Morka, A. 1998. Kto Sprowadza Ropę Do Polski. Warszawa: Rzeczpospolita. 30.10.
12 W. OSTROWSKI
Nagy, S., S. Rychlicki, and J. Siemek. 2009. “Stan Obecny I Ewolucja Stosunków Gazowych Rosji Z 
Unią Europejską I Polską.” Polityka Energetyczna 12: 393–422.
Nocuń, M., and A. Brzeziecki. 2010. Schodek Po Schodku. Warszawa: Tygodnik Powszechny. 08.06.
Olczyk, E., K. Baranowska, and T. Furman. 2013. Gudzowaty. Człowiek Z Gazu. Warszawa: 
Rzeczpospolita. 15.02.
Omelan, G., and W. Opioła. 2012. Poland’s Energy Balance and Its Future. The Case Study of Gas as an 
Energy Source. Warszawa: Gospodarka, Rynek, Edukacja. 13.4.
Ostrowski, M. 2010. “Prasa a Polityka Zagraniczna’.” In Polityka Zagraniczna Polski Po Wstąpieniu Do 
NATO I Do Unii Europejskiej: Problemy Tożsamości I Adaptacji, edited by S. Bieleń. Warszawa: Difin. 
247–268.
Paszewski, T. 2011. “Polityka Państw Wobec Sektorów Nafty I Gazu W Latach 1990-2010.” Polityka 
Energetyczna 14: 5–28.
Perlez, J., 1996. Polish Premier, Ex-Communist Accused of Spying, Resigns. New York Times, 01.25.
Piński, A., and K. Trębski. 2003. Gazoholicy. Vol. 9.11. Warszawa: Wprost.
Roth, M. 2011. “Poland as a Policy Entrepreneur in European External Energy Policy: Towards Greater 
Energy Solidarity Vis-à-vis Russia?” Geopolitics 16 (3): 600–625. doi:10.1080/ 
14650045.2011.520865.
Schmidt-Felzmann, A. 2008. “All for One? EU Member States and the Union’s Common Policy 
Towards the Russian Federation.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 16 (2): 169–187. 
doi:10.1080/14782800802309771.
Sejmu, U., 1990. “Uchwała Sejmu RP Z 9 Listopada 1990 R. W Sprawie Zalozen Polityki Energetycznej 
Polski Do 2010 R.” Monitor Polski z 1990 r., nr 43, poz. 332.
Sharples, J. 2012. “Russo–Polish Energy Security Relations: A Case of Threatening Dependency, 
Supply Guarantee, or Regional Energy Security Dynamics?” Political Perspectives 6 (1): 27–50.
Skórzynski, J. 2003. System Rywina. Warsaw: Presspublika.
Solska, J. 2013. Dwaj Panowie K. Warszawa: Polityka. 08.12.
Staniszkis, J. 2001 Postkomunizm . Próba Opisu. Moscow: Wyd. słowo/obraz terytoria.
Szeptycki, A. 2009. Polityka Polski Wobec Ukrainy, 156–175. Vol. 01. Warszawa: Rocznik Polskiej 
Polityki Zagranicznej.
Taras, R. 2014. “Russia Resurgent, Russophobia in Decline? Polish Perceptions of Relations with the 
Russian Federation 2004–2012.” Europe-Asia Studies 66 (5): 710–734. doi:10.1080/ 
09668136.2014.898432.
Todorowa, M. 2016. Naftowi Gracze. Moscow: Forbes Russia, 23.05.
Tomaszewski, P. 2011. “Bezpieczeństwo Energetyczne Polski W Założeniach Programowych Prawa I 
Sprawiedliwości.” Historia I Polityka 6 (13): 111–121. doi:10.12775/HiP.2011.029.
Tymanowski, J. 2012. “Bezpieczeństwo Polityczne I Ekonomiczne W Relacjach Polsko- Rosyjskich.” In 
Geopolityka W Stosunkach Polsko-Rosyjskich, edited by S. Bieleń, and A. Skrzypek. Wydział 
Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych: Uniwersytet Warszawski. 65–87.
Víctor, D., and N. Makarova Víctor. 2004. The Belarus Connection: Exporting Russian Gas to Germany 
and Poland. Stanford: Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. Geopolitics of Natural 
Gas Study, No. 26.
Wagstyl, S., 2004. Polish businessman warns of ‘damaging’ political attacks. Financial Times, 09.11.
Wantuch, D. 2016. Resort Węgla I Smogu. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza. 22.07.
Wiadomosci, W. P. 2002. Od 2008 R. Norweski Gaz Dla Polski; Miller Zapowiada Weryfikację Kontraktu. 
Warszawa: Wiadomosci WP. 03.09.
Wielowieyska, D. 2015. Afera Orlenowska, Kulczyk I Wiele Nieścisłości. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza. 
06.08.
Woś, R. 2014. Dziecięca Choroba Liberalizmu. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Studio Emka.
Zarycki, T. 2009. “The Power of the Intelligentsia: The Rywin Affair and the Challenge of Applying the 
Concept of Cultural Capital to Analyze Poland’s Elites.” Theory and Society 38 (6): 613–648. 
doi:10.1007/s11186-009-9092-6.
Zeniewski, P. 2011. “Poland’s Energy Security and the Origins of the Yamal Contract with Russia.” The 
Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 20 (2): 38.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 13
